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FOREWORD
This paper, by Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution,
reconstitutes SSI’s Letort Papers series. This group of publications
include papers, retrospectives, speeches or essays of interest to the
defense academic community that may not correspond with our
mainstream policy-oriented publications.
In this Letort Paper, Dr. O’Hanlon suggests how reductions in
various weapons modernization programs and other economies
might release funds for the critical needs of U.S. ground forces.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MICHAEL E. O’HANLON is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies
at the Brookings Institution. His recent books include The Future
of Arms Control (Brookings, 2005, with Michael A. Levi), Neither
Star Wars nor Sanctuary (Brookings, 2004), and Crisis on the Korean
Peninsula (McGraw Hill, 2003, with Mike Mochizuki).

iv

SUMMARY
In this defense strategy and budget monograph, Michael
O’Hanlon argues that America’s large defense budget cannot
be pared realistically in the years ahead. But given the extreme
demands of the Iraq mission, particularly on the U.S. Army and
Marine Corps, he suggests how reductions in various weapons
modernization programs and other economies might free up enough
funds to add at least 40,000 more ground troops to today’s military.
O’Hanlon also addresses the important question of how the United
States might encourage and help other countries to share more of
the global military burden. Finally, he sketches other cost cutting
measures such as privatization. These cost saving ideas all require
serious consideration because of the enormous strain being placed
on the size and cost of the U.S. ground forces.
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U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY AFTER SADDAM
What military will the United States need in the future, and
how much will it cost? In an era of apocalyptic terror, and at a time
of $400 billion defense budgets and $400 billion federal budget
deﬁcits, these questions are of central concern to Americans―both
on national security grounds and economic grounds.
Answering these questions is extremely difﬁcult because the
United States simply does not know what type of world it will ﬁnd
in the future. The United States can, for the foreseeable future, be
conﬁdent that its armed forces will remain engaged in Iraq, as well as
in Afghanistan and other theaters related to the war on terror. It will
also need to remain involved in deterrence missions in the Western
Paciﬁc, most notably in regard to Korea and the Taiwan Strait. It will
wish to remain strongly engaged in European security, less because
of threats to that region than because it is the continent where most
of America’s main security partners are located―meaning that the
strength and capabilities and cohesion of the NATO alliance have
important implications for the United States globally.
But the United States does not know which, if any, major new
wars it may have to wage in the coming years. It does not know if
relations with the People’s Republic of China will continue to improve
or again worsen, even risking the possibility of war over Taiwan. It
does not know if the current nuclear crisis with North Korea will be
resolved peacefully; it cannot predict whether any other countries
will allow their territories to be used by terrorist organizations bent
on attacking the United States. Additional military scenarios could
be immensely important to America as well, even if they are not
of the classic variety―such as civil conﬂict within nuclear-armed
Pakistan or another between that country and nuclear-armed India,
both of which could lead to large-scale stabilization or peacekeeping
missions. Other major uncertainties include the degree to which the
proliferation of dangerous nuclear and biological technologies can
be contained, and the degree to which Islamic fundamentalism will
affect the politics of countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia in the
coming years.
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Thus defense planning must be based on subjective assumptions.
The important thing is to postulate circumstances that are realistic
but not imprudently optimistic. The nation should spend what is
required on the military, including a margin of safety. But it should
not and cannot waste money on its armed forces. Federal deﬁcits are
on course to remain over $400 billion and exceed $500 billion a year
by the decade’s end. Even if Mr. Bush is successful in halving them
by then, an unlikely proposition, they are likely to grow quickly
thereafter. They will thus remain at the economically unhealthy
level of nearly 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), driving
down national savings rates and increasing America’s dependence
on foreign investors to propel its economy. Longer-term ﬁscal trends
are even worse, given the pending retirement of the baby boomers,
together with rising health care costs.1 The United States cannot
afford to waste funds on combat formations and weapons that are
not truly needed.2
It is easy for defense planners to dwell on the problems, but a great
deal is good in today’s global security situation. The United States
leads a remarkable and historic alliance system. Never before has
a great power elicited such support from the world’s other powers
and provoked so little direct opposition. These observations remain
true, if more precariously so, even after the Bush administration’s
internationally unpopular decision to go to war against Saddam
Hussein in 2003. Even powers outside this alliance system―Russia,
China, India, Indonesia―generally choose to cooperate with the
United States and its allies on many security issues. They are
likely to continue doing so, provided that American military power
remains credible, and that the U.S.-led alliance system continues to
be founded (however imperfectly) on common values on which most
countries agree. This conclusion can be jeopardized―by a United
States that seems too unilateralist, or by allies that seem to prefer free
riding to doing their fair share in international security. But what
is most impressive about the western alliance system is how strong
and durable it has become.
Some fear American power, and even many Americans think it is
excessive. Indeed, it is impressive. But as Barry Posen convincingly
argues, the United States is far from omnipotent. Past historical eras
such as those during which the European colonial powers could easily
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conquer distant lands are gone.3 In today’s world, the United States
can be understood in Posen’s phrase to possess impressive command
of the commons―air, oceans, and space―but to have a great deal of
trouble contending with many conﬂicts on land, particularly against
irregular resistance ﬁghters.4 Moreover, America’s high sensitivity
to casualties limits its inclination to use military force. And its highly
open and democratic political system suggests that it need not be
feared to the extent many do.5
So American power is, even in these politically contentious
times, generally a force for good in the world. Alas, maintaining
global military capabilities, holding together this alliance network,
and preserving stability in the global system cost money. The
United States presently accounts for almost half of all global military
spending. But even so, the central budgetary argument of this
monograph is that the U.S. defense budget must continue to rise at
the pace planned by the Bush administration―roughly $10 billion a
year, or 2 to 3 percent, above and beyond the inﬂation rate. Indeed,
more funds are needed to increase the size of the active ground forces
by some 40,000 personnel for several years, meaning that certain
weapons programs preferred by the administration will need to be
slowed or streamlined to stay within projected budgets. Once the
Iraq mission is concluded, it may be possible to then hold real-dollar
defense spending steady―but right now it is simply too soon to say.
U.S. MILITARY BASICS
The current U.S. defense establishment is not large in terms of
personnel. U.S. troops and most types of military force structure
have declined about one-third since the latter Cold War years. (They
now number 1.4 million active duty troops, plus about one million
reservists, of whom some 150,000 to 200,000 have been activated at
any time in recent years.6) That active duty force is just over half the
size of China’s military, and not that much larger than the armed
forces of India, Russia, or North Korea. Nevertheless, the American
armed forces are extensively engaged around the world―not even
counting the large forces now in and around Iraq. The United States
has a larger military presence outside its borders than does any other
country―some 400,000 troops as of early-to-mid-2005.
3

Republicans and Democrats generally agree about the broad
contours of American military planning and sizing. Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
reafﬁrmed the active duty troop levels of about 1.4 million maintained
during the Clinton administration and also retained most of President
Clinton’s agenda for weapons modernization. After September 11,
2001, Secretary Rumsfeld sought and received a great deal more
budget authority than President Clinton’s defense plan called for.
But a Democratic president would almost certainly also have boosted
defense spending after the tragic attacks, since the existing Pentagon
plan was underfunded. Moreover, no major Democratic candidate
for President in 2004 made a major issue out of the enormous size of
the U.S. defense budget.
That Rumsfeld retained most Clinton-era ideas and programs is
relatively unsurprising. Although decisions to buy speciﬁc weapons
can be debated, the military needs many new or refurbished planes,
ships, and ground vehicles since much of the weaponry bought
during the Reagan buildup is wearing out. America’s technological
edge in combat may not require every weapon now in development
or production, but the advantages to maintaining a resounding
superiority in weaponry are evidenced in the rapid victories and
relatively low casualties (on all sides, America’s and its enemies’)
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Talk of cutting back on
ground forces during the early Rumsfeld tenure has stopped―at
least for the foreseeable future―given the challenges posed by the
post-Saddam Iraq stabilization mission.
The Two-War Framework and Beyond.
Since the Cold War ended, U.S. armed forces have been designed
to be able to ﬁght two full-scale wars at once. Rumsfeld modiﬁed
the requirement in 2001 so that only one of the victories needed to be
immediate and overwhelming.
But the basic logic of the idea was retained―and should be
retained, even assuming the successful stabilization of post-Saddam
Iraq. A two-war capability of some sort permits the United States to
ﬁght one war without letting down its guard everywhere else, which
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would undercut deterrence and perhaps increase the likelihood of a
second conﬂict. This capability is needed with or without the Bush
administration’s preemption doctrine―a controversial cornerstone
on which to base American security policy, but hardly a controversial
concept since no U.S. president should be expected to stand by while
an enemy visibly prepares an attack on this country.7 Moreover, as
Rumsfeld noted in his revised plan, the U.S. military must be able to
conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.8
Readiness.
There is little doubt that the readiness of U.S. military forces
should be very high. That term, according to the Pentagon, refers
to the ability of individual military units to perform the tasks they
have been assigned in a timely and proﬁcient way. In other words,
readiness does not refer to broad choices about sizing or modernizing
the military or properly deﬁning its strategy. Instead, once these
broad strategic choices are made, readiness refers to how well the
DoD’s individual ﬁghting units can carry out the missions they have
been assigned.
Viewed this way, readiness is still a very broad subject.
Measuring it accurately requires a wide array of metrics ranging
from the competence and training, and even the morale of people,
to the availability of spare parts and ammunition and fuel, to the
condition of major equipment. Weaknesses have arisen in readiness
in certain parts of the force over the past decade, such as insufﬁcient
numbers of pilots and other technically skilled individuals and some
deterioration in the availability of Air Force transport and combat
aircraft. Still, readiness has, overall, been quite robust in the modern
era and remains that way, though that conclusion must be tempered
by the fact that DoD was far less forthcoming with readiness data
recently than in the past. It may have suffered some degradation due
to the high pace of recent activities, and lately was described by Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Myers as “good” rather
than the more customary “high” or “excellent.” Some indicators
are worrisome, such as the increase in the rate of serious aircraft
accidents.9 But it is no surprise, and generally presents only modest
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risk, that recently deployed divisions or air wings or carrier groups
require a few weeks or months of recovery after being deployed.
So some perspective is in order. Moreover, the peculiarities of the
service’s readiness scoring systems, and the opaqueness of some
readiness methodologies, should not be forgotten.10 As Richard Betts
reminds us, in readiness debates statistics often lie even more than
they do in other spheres.11
Current Deployments.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. military had about 250,000
uniformed personnel stationed or deployed overseas at any given
time. Just over half were in permanent bases; the others on temporary
assignments away from home base and families. In broad terms, just
under 100,000 U.S. troops were in East Asia (mostly in Japan and
South Korea or on ships in the western Paciﬁc), just over 100,000
were in Europe (mostly in Germany, with other substantial totals
in the United Kingdom and Italy), and some 25,000 were ashore or
aﬂoat in the Persian Gulf region.
Since that time, of course, deployments have increased
enormously in the Central Command’s (CENTCOM) theater of
responsibility, encompassing, as it does, Afghanistan and environs,
as well as Iraq. As of early 2004, more than 200,000 personnel were in
the CENTCOM zone (modest numbers being Coast Guard personnel
or civilians working for DoD). That number included 114,000 in Iraq
and 26,000 in Kuwait. All together, these deployments made for a
grand total of about 400,000 uniformed personnel overseas in one
place or another.12
DoD is planning major changes in its overseas basing.13 Among
the proposed changes are to relocate many American forces in Korea
south of the Han River and out of Seoul, and to move large numbers
of troops who have been garrisoned in Germany either back home
or to smaller, less permanent bases in eastern Europe where they
would be closer to potential combat zones.
THE PENTAGON BUDGET
America’s defense budget is staggeringly high. Depending on
how one estimates the spending of countries such as China and
6

Russia, U.S. defense spending almost equals that of the rest of the
world combined. In 2002, prior to additional U.S. budget increases
as well as the added costs of the war in Iraq, American defense
spending equaled that of all the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), Russia, China, and Japan, combined.
That said, judging whether U.S. defense spending is high or
low depends on the measure. Compared with other countries, it
is obviously enormous (see Table 1 on international comparisons).
Relative to the size of the American economy, by contrast, it remains
modest by modern historical standards at about 4 percent of GDP
(half of typical Cold War levels, though nearly twice the current
average of most of its major allies). Compared with Cold War
norms, it is high in inﬂation-adjusted or constant dollars, though not
astronomically so.
The reasons for a very large U.S. defense budget are not hard to
understand. The United States has security alliances or close partnerships with more than 70 overseas countries (all of the other 25
members of NATO, all of the Rio Pact countries in Latin America,
several allies in the Western Paciﬁc, and roughly a dozen countries
in the Persian Gulf/Mideast region). It alone among the world’s
powers takes seriously the need to project substantial amounts of
military power quickly over great distances for sustained periods.
Indeed, the United States possesses more than two-thirds of the
world’s collective power projection capability (and an even higher
percentage if one focuses on high-quality units).14 The United States
alone undergirds a collective security system in the western world
that helps countries from South Korea and Japan, to Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, to many NATO members, feel secure enough that they
do not have to engage in arms races with neighbors, launch preemptive wars of their own, or develop nuclear weapons.
The Recent Growth in the U.S. Defense Budget.
Still, one might ask why an active duty military of the same size
as the Clinton administration’s has grown in cost by more $100
billion a year during the Bush presidency. Speciﬁcally, the 2000
budget for national security (DoD plus nuclear weapons activities
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YEAR OR PERIOD

MEAN SPENDING
LEVEL

1960s (1962-1969)
Peak year 1968
1970s
Peak year 1970
1980s
Peak year 1989
1990s
Peak year 1991
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

382
463
315
414
379
440
359
430
325
328
364
412
454
445
413
416
426
436

MEAN SPENDING,
Percent OF GDP
10.7
9.5
5.9
8.1
5.8
5.6
4.1
5.4
3.0
3.0
3.4
3.7
3.9
3.7
3.4
3.4
3.3
3.3

Note: Peak years refer to the year when the inﬂation-adjusted dollar total was highest for
the time period in question. This table shows budget function 050, including DoD and DoE
(but it does not include homeland security activities except those carried out by DoD).
Source: President George W. Bush, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005:
Historical Tables, Washington, DC: Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, 2004, pp. 126-128.

Table 1. U.S. National Security Spending in Modern Historical
Perspective (Outlays in Billions of 2005 Dollars).
of the Department of Energy [DOE]) was $305 billion and the
administration’s 2005 request was $423 billion.15 Inﬂation accounts
for 10 percent of that $118 billion increase between 2000 and 2005,
but that leaves roughly $100 billion in real-dollar growth. (Note that
these ﬁgures do not even count the costs of military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq that have been running at more than $60 billion
annually. Of the total increase, 27 percent is in military personnel
accounts, 27 percent in operations and maintenance, 17 percent in
procurement, 25 percent in research, development, testing, and
evaluation, and about 4 percent in nuclear weapons activities.
Of these totals, the personnel increases are due primarily to more
generous compensation packages (funds for activating reservists
8

and for temporarily increasing the size of the active duty military are
primarily in the supplemental bills). The operations and maintenance
increases reﬂect the relentless upward pressure on accounts for
health care, equipment maintenance, environmental cleanup, and the
like, together with the Bush administration’s decision to fully fund
“readiness” accounts for training and equipment maintenance. The
increases in acquisition funding are partly due to missile defense ($5
billion a year higher than under Clinton), and partly to Rumsfeld’s
“transformation” initiatives (again, about $5 billion annually).
But they also reﬂect the necessary decision to restore funding for
hardware to historic norms after a “procurement holiday” in the
1990s.
How much does the war on terror account for this increase in the
defense budget? Not very much, since, as noted, most of those costs
(including those for protecting American airspace through Operation
NOBLE EAGLE) are funded out of supplemental appropriations
bills. The Pentagon’s funding for homeland security, for example,
is only about $8 billion, made up of activities such as the support
provided by some 25,000 soldiers in the United States to protecting
the homeland.16 Similar activities overseas make the total for activities
such as base security funded through the regular DoD budget about
$10 billion annually.17 Roughly another $5 billion may have been
devoted to expansions in the classiﬁed $40 billion annual intelligence
budget (hidden within DoD’s budget), some of which are clearly
tied to the war on terror.18 Similarly, the annual budget for special
operations command has been increased by about $3 billion, to $6.6
billion (and personnel totals by about 5,000).19 But even adding up
all these pieces, less than 20 percent of the $100 billion real-dollar
growth in the annual Pentagon budget is due to the direct effects of
the war on terror.
Further Planned Budget Increases.
The current era of increasing defense spending does not yet
appear to be over. Expectations are for continued annual increases of
about $20 billion a year―roughly twice what is needed to compensate
for the effects of inﬂation (or to put it differently, real budgets are
expected to keep rising at about $10 billion a year). By 2009, the
9

annual national security budget would total about $500 billion, in
rough numbers―about $450 billion when expressed in 2005 dollars.
Indeed, given the administration’s plans, that is a conservative
estimate of what its future defense program would cost the country
(not even including any added costs from future military operations
or the ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan). The Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce estimates that, to fully fund the Pentagon’s current
plans, average annual costs from 2010 through 2020 would exceed
$480 billion (in 2005 dollars) and perhaps as much as $530 billion.20
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO CONSTRAIN
FUTURE DEFENSE BUDGETS?
Given the country’s security needs, it is important to spend as
much on the military as is necessary. But given its ﬁscal predicament,
it is important not to spend more than prudence dictates.
To get a rough sense of what economies may be feasible within
the Pentagon budget, it is worth noting that several factors push
defense spending up faster than that 1 percent real growth level―
but also several may permit slower (or even zero) growth. Starting
with these factors in mind makes it easier to see why 1 percent real
growth is probably the right general frame of reference within which
to project future defense spending.
Historically, real operating costs per uniformed individual have
increased at 2 percent to 3 percent per year. Weapons costs have
grown comparably. Rising health care, environmental cleanup, and
other such activities affect the military as much as any other sector
of the economy. For example, DoD’s medical costs almost doubled
in real terms between 1988 and 2003, to just under $30 billion.21 In
addition, while military compensation is now rather good for most
troops (by comparison with civilian jobs requiring comparable
experience and education), it is important that it stay that way. To
attract top-notch people, military pay increases must keep up with
civilian pay, which can require real growth of at least 1 percent a
year.22 Moreover, further increases in pay for certain speciﬁc groups
may be appropriate, such as highly-skilled technicians with much
more remunerative job opportunities in the private sector, or those

10

reservists called up to active duty for extended periods who sacriﬁce
large amounts of income as a result.23
Several other areas offer some hope of savings. Greater use of
relatively inexpensive high technology computers and electronics
can allow rapid improvements in military capabilities at modest
cost. Defense efﬁciencies through privatization and other reforms
may save at least modest sums. And greater assistance from allies
may reduce overall demands on American forces, especially over a
10-year period like that being considered here.
More Burdensharing?
Today the United States outspends its major allies by about 2 to 1,
but outdistances them in military force that can be projected overseas
and sustained there by a ratio of at least 5 to 1. Most American
allies spent the Cold War preparing to defend their own or nearby
territories against a Soviet threat. American forces focused on how
to deploy and operate forces many thousands of miles from home.
Most U.S. allies have gotten serious about this effort only since the
Cold War ended (if then).
Shifting defense responsibilities to our allies is an idea that is
attractive in the United States. Unfortunately, near-term prospects
for doing so to any signiﬁcant degree are not good, even though
many U.S. allies have good militaries, strong military traditions, and
a high-tech industrial base. The problem is largely political. It is not
that Europeans are as force-averse as some argue. The phrase that
“Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus,” meaning that
the former are inclined to use force and the latter to use more peaceful
inducements in their foreign policy, is overstated as evidenced by
European military action in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and, to
some extent, even Iraq. However, it is probably true that Europeans
do not believe the world to be quite as dangerous a place as Americans
typically do. And even if Europeans are far from paciﬁst, on average
they are not quite as inclined to use force as is the United States.
Several European countries face ﬁscal deﬁcits that, combined with
their political priorities and their voters’ threat perceptions, probably
preclude big defense buildups. They also have strong incentives to
free-ride on U.S. commitments. European nations also often cite their
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substantial contributions to peacekeeping missions as evidence that
they are already bearing a considerable share of the defense burden.
Germany and Japan are disinclined to remilitarize, and their former
adversaries, including Americans, who remember World War II,
hesitate to urge them to abandon this reticence.24
Some progress has been made. European defense budgets
have gone up about 25 percent in this decade. Their militaries are
developing the combined capacity to deploy up to 60,000 troops at
a considerable geographic distance and to sustain them there for a
year. Japan is slowly enlarging its interpretation of which military
missions are consistent with its post–World War II constitution. U.S.,
British, and French programs are slowly helping African militaries
improve their skills. And the transatlantic quarrel over Iraq may help
motivate European countries to develop more military capability to
gain greater inﬂuence in decisions on the use of force. Reallocations
of about 10 percent of current major allied military spending could
in theory give other Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries fully half as much deployable
military capability as the United States within a decade.25 That, in
turn, could allow modest reductions in American troop strength, if
not right away, then eventually.
Emphasizing Advanced Electronics and Computers
in Defense Modernization.
One reason the Pentagon budget is slated to grow so much in
coming years―with real increases of closer to 2 percent a year than
the 1 percent targeted here―has to do with buying weaponry. Some
of the upward pressure arises from high-proﬁle issues such as
missile defense. But most comes from the main combat systems of
the military services, which are generally wearing out. Living off
the fruits of the Reagan military buildup, the Clinton administration
spent an average of $50 billion a year on equipment, only about 15
percent of the defense budget in contrast to a historical norm of about
25 percent. This “procurement holiday” must end, and is ending.
But the Pentagon’s weapons-modernization plan is excessive.
Despite Bush’s presidential election campaign promise to “skip a
generation” of weaponry, his Pentagon has canceled only three major
12

weapon systems―the Navy’s lower-altitude missile defense program,
the Army’s Crusader howitzer (which was not even particularly
expensive), and more recently the Army’s Comanche helicopter.
Although procurement budgets must continue rising, the rapid
increases envisioned in current plans are not essential. Economies
can almost certainly be found through expanded applications of
modestly priced technologies, such as the precision weapons and
communications systems used so effectively in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The Bush plan lacks clear priorities. It proposes to replace major
combat systems throughout the force structure with systems typically
costing twice as much. Even though procurement budgets have
not yet risen dramatically, the current plan will soon oblige them
to do so―and it has already led to historic increases in the research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) budget for advanced
systems development.26 A more discriminating and economy-minded
modernization strategy would equip only part―not all―of the armed
forces with the most sophisticated and expensive weaponry. That
high-end component would hedge against new exigencies, such as
an unexpectedly rapid modernizing of the Chinese military. The
rest of the military establishment would be equipped primarily with
relatively inexpensive upgrades of existing weaponry, including
better sensors, munitions, computers, and communications systems.
Such an approach would not keep the procurement budget in the
range of $70 billion to $75 billion, but it might hold it to $80 billion
to $90 billion a year, instead of $100 billion or more. The Bush
administration’s 2006 budget request moved somewhat in this
direction, with the announcement of plans to scale back weapons
purchases for systems such as the F-22, C-130J, missile defense, and
aircraft carrier ﬂeet. But a pruning knife might still be taken to the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Army’s future combat systems (FCS)
program, the V-22 Osprey, and several other programs.
Privatization and Reform.
All defense planners would love to save money in the relatively
low-proﬁle parts of the Pentagon budget known as operations and
maintenance. These accounts, which pay for a wide range of activities
13

including training, overseas deployments, upkeep of equipment,
military base operations, and health care costs―in short, for nearterm military readiness― have been rising fast in recent years, and it
will be hard to stop the upward trend.27
Some savings are already in the works. Congress has agreed to
authorize another round of base closures in 2005.28 Since the Cold
War ended, U.S. military forces have shrunk by more than onethird, yet domestic base capacity has fallen only 20 percent. Once
completed, retrenchment of base capacity will save at least $5 billion
annually. Overhauling military health care services by merging the
independent health plans of each military service and introducing
a small copayment for military personnel and their families could
save $2 billion or more per year.29 Other savings in operations and
maintenance are possible. For example, encouraging local base
commanders to economize by letting them keep some of the resulting
savings for their base activities could save a billion dollars a year or
more within a decade.30
All that said, these accounts are crucial to national security and
have proved tough to cap or contain. Privatization is no panacea;
it takes time, sometimes raises various complicated issues about
deploying civilians to wartime environments, and generally saves
much less than its warmest advocates attest.31 But if operating costs
can be held to a 1 percent real rise instead of the historical norm
exceeding 2 percent, a slower pace of defense budget growth may
someday be within reach.
These cost-saving ideas all require serious consideration because
the case for increased expenditure in one part of the defense budget―
the size and cost of ground forces―also needs to be made. Enormous
strain is now being imposed on U.S. Soldiers and Marines by the Iraq
mission and other responsibilities. Alas, there is little prospect these
strains will fade away anytime soon. The top priority for defense
planners today is thus to avoid breaking the American ground forces
by driving out good people who decide they are no longer willing to
endure the excessive pace of deployment after deployment.
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